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In his basic model of debt renegotiation, BESTER [1994] argues that collateral is 
more effective if high risk projects are financed. This result, however, crucially 
depends on the definition of risk. Using the second-order stochastic dominance 
criterion introduced by ROTHSCHILD AND STIGLITZ [1970], we show that it is not a 
project’s high risk, induced by a high probability of default, that makes collateral 
more effective. Instead it turns out that, given the expected return, the probability 
of default has no impact on the collateral’s effectiveness. Moreover, a higher risk 
of the project caused by a higher loss given default makes the use of collateral even 
less effective. 
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1  Introduction 
The  optimal  design  of  a  loan  contract  is  one  of  the  topics  most  intensively 
analyzed in institutional economics. Particularly, the importance of collateral in 
mitigating problems of asymmetric information due to credit risk is pointed out in 
a large theoretical and empirical literature. Ever since the mid 70s, information 
asymmetries have been highly emphasized in economic theory. On the one hand, 
moral hazard provides risk incentive arising when a borrower protected by limited 
liability has the choice between different levels of risk (cf. JENSEN AND MECKLING 
[1976]). On the other hand, within an adverse selection setting, less risky projects 
may be crowded out. As STIGLITZ AND WEISS [1981] have pointed out, the lender 
cannot be compensated for increased risk by an additional risk premium because 
under  both  regimes,  moral  hazard  and  adverse  selection,  higher  contractual 
interest rates imply even worse incentives. Therefore, a rising interest rate may 
lead  to  a  decline  in  the  lender’s  expected  return.  This,  in  turn,  implies  the 
possibility  of  equilibrium  credit  rationing.  Within  the  literature  relying  on  the 
Stiglitz and Weiss-model, higher risk is typically associated with a lower expected 
return  since  otherwise  risk  incentive  caused  by  moral  hazard  or  crowding  out 
caused by adverse selection are irrelevant from a social point of view. However, 
as already noted by KÜRSTEN [1995], these results do no longer hold in general if 
increasing risk is associated with a constant expected return. We will take up this 
point in the main section of our paper. 
Apart from a higher interest rate, the introduction of collateral to loan contracts 
increases the lender’s expected return, and improves the borrower’s incentives. 
Bester [1985], [1987] has shown that under adverse selection or moral hazard, 
collateral  reduces  agency  costs  associated  with  debt  financing.  In  both  cases, 
collateral  should  be  used  in  financing  less  risky  projects  while  debt  contracts 
specified  for  riskier  projects  should  not  include  collateral.  Under  adverse 
selection, borrowers endowed with a less risky project provide collateral in order 
to send a signal which is too costly for borrowers with a riskier project to imitate. 
Under moral hazard, the use of costly collateral only pays off if the borrower 
cannot  commit  himself  to  a  less  risky  project  otherwise.  If  he  cannot  commit 
himself to that less risky project even using costly collateral, he will certainly 
refrain from doing so. Therefore, both types of debt models imply that collateral 
should be associated with low-risk projects. 
To our best knowledge, there is just one model leading to mixed predictions 
regarding the relation between risk and the use of collateral. BOOT, THAKOR AND 
UDELL [1991] use a two-stage set up with two types of borrowers. The first step 
consists of a pure effort-incentive problem. By assumption, only for the bad type 
it is first best to exert any effort. The second-best solution calls for the bad type’s 
contract stipulating some collateral while the good type does not have to provide 
collateral. The second step integrates adverse selection into the model implying 
that  any  loan  contract  contains  some  collateral.  If  debt  contracts  are  not  fully 3 
secured, the contract for the bad type uses less collateral than the good type’s 
one.
1 
From an empirical point of view, the relationship between project risk and the 
use of collateral is ambiguous. Unlike the theoretical predictions of the models 
cited above, according to practitioner’s wisdom, the optimal loan is an unsecured 
credit  because  it  has  been  profitably  paid  out  even  without  collateral.  As  a 
corollary, collateral is used in the case of a substantial default risk. Econometric 
studies  reveal  mixed  evidence.  While,  e.g.,  BERGER  AND  UDELL  [1990]  and 
BOOTH  AND  BOOTH  [2006]  report  a  positive  relation  between  project  risk  and 
collateralization, BERGER AND UDELL [1995], MACHAUER AND WEBER [1998], or 
ELSAS AND KRAHNEN [2002] do not find any significant correlation. LEHMANN 
AND NEUBERGER [2001] even report a negative correlation between risk and the 
use  of  collateral.  Quite  remarkably,  the  studies  indicating  an  ambiguous  or  a 
negative  correlation  focus  on  relationship  lending  which  itself  has  no  clear 
implication on the creditor’s risk. 
The  model  of  BESTER  [1994]  provides  an  explanation  for  this  negative 
correlation  by  accounting  for  the  role  of  collateral  on  debt  renegotiation. 
Therefore, his model implies comparative static results which are in clear contrast 
to the findings of the Stiglitz and Weiss-type models. Bester uses the setting of a 
costly state-verification as introduced by TOWNSEND [1978] and as applied to debt 
contracts by GALE AND HELLWIG [1985]. Within this type of model, project risk is 
exogenously  given  and  commonly  known.  Instead,  the  financial  outcome  is 
observable  only  for  the  borrower  while  the  lender  has  to  incur  some  costs  to 
monitor the project’s success. Bester extends this setting by allowing for mixed 
strategies on part of both, the borrower and the lender. If the project is successful, 
the  borrower  has  the  choice  between  meeting  his  contractual  obligations  or 
cheating and opting for a strategic default, i.e. not paying back the loan even if he 
is capable to do so. The latter strategy might be individually superior because the 
lender cannot distinguish between a strategic default and a liquidity default which 
occurs if the project fails. (In the following, we use the term “default” exclusively 
for the liquidity default or project failure, whereas we refer to “cheating” in case 
of a strategic default.) If a borrower has not paid back his loan because of one 
reason  or  the  other,  a  lender  may  either  choose  to  take  over  the  firm  via  a 
bankruptcy  procedure  or  to  opt  for  a  renegotiation  resulting  in  a  reduced 
repayment  obligation.  Games  including  this  kind  of  costly  monitoring  are 
typically solved by mixed-strategy equilibria. 
In Bester’s model, collateral may be used to alter the borrower’s incentive to 
cheat and the lender’s incentive to choose a bankruptcy strategy towards a less 
costly solution, i.e. a lower probability of both cheating and choosing bankruptcy. 
Collateral  turns  out  to  be  most  effective  if  the  probability  of  default  is  high. 
Therefore, Bester’s model stands in clear contrast to any alternative model of debt 
contracts – except for the BOOT, THAKOR AND UDELL [1991] paper pointing on 
monetary  theory  –  in  linking  collateral  to  high-risk  projects,  thereby  aligning 
                                                 
1   It should be noted, however, that the Boot et al. paper focuses on monetary policy 
rather than on financial contracting. 4 
theoretical  rigor  with  practitioner’s  wisdom  and  some  part  of  the  empirical 
literature. 
In the present paper, we address the question if the relation between increasing 
risk  and  the  profitability  of  collateral  continues  to  hold  if  a  varying  risk  is 
modeled as a shift in pure risk, i.e. holding constant the project’s expected return. 
We do this employing the ROTHSCHILD AND STIGLITZ [1970] notion of increasing 
risk. The question is tackled within the framework of the BESTER [1994] model – 
i.e. assuming just costly state-verification and neglecting any other problem of 
information  asymmetry  like  moral  hazard  or  adverse  selection  –  because  it  is 
precisely  this  framework  leading  to  a  comparative  static  result  contradicting 
alternative models on the use of collateral. For the same reason we do not refer to 
inside  collateral  which  might  be  of  interest  if  multiple  lending  is  taken  into 
account. 
In fact, we show that Bester’s result crucially relies on defining risk by the 
project’s probability of default, holding all other parameters constant. Obviously, 
in  this  interpretation,  increasing  risk  implies  a  decreasing  expected  return. 
Holding constant the project’s expected return, increasing risk is shown either to 
have no influence on the benefit of collateral or to reduce its benefit, depending on 
whether risk is measured by the probability of default or by the loss given default. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we briefly present 
the basic structure of an extended model of debt renegotiation. In Section 3, we 
analyze the influence of the probability of default and the loss given default as 
mean-preserving risk measures. Section 4 concludes. 
2  The model 
Following  BESTER  [1994],  we  consider  a  game  of  debt  contract  design  and 
renegotiation where the borrower B is a risk-neutral entrepreneur who needs to 
raise capital for a risky investment project and where the lender L is a risk-neutral 
bank. Without loss of generality, the fixed investment is normalized to one and 
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where  r   is  the  project’s  rate  of  return  in  case  of  success,  ) 1 ; 0 (  ¸ PD   is  the 
probability of default, and  ) 1 ; 0 (  ¸ LGD  is the loss given default. The project’s 
expected rate of return 
(1) 
) (
1 ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 (
LGD r PD r
LGD PD r PD  
+ − =
− − + + − =
 
is assumed to be positive so that the project is ex ante profitable if the riskless rate 
of return is normalized to zero. 
The  borrower  observes  the  realization  of  the  return  without  any  cost.  The 
lender,  however,  receives  this  information  only  if  taking  over  the  project. 
Monitoring and liquidating the project is costly for him. Since return realizations 5 
are not verifiable to third parties, the borrower’s repayment obligation cannot be 
conditioned on the project’s outcome. 
While  the  borrower  has  no  liquid  funds,  he  owns  some  amount  w  of 
collateralizable wealth. This wealth cannot be used to finance investment directly, 
but the lender may use it as collateral  w c ≤  for the loan. Taking possession of and 
liquidating  c typically involves transaction costs  ) 1 ( β −  with  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ β , so that 
the lender’s net valuation of c equals  c β . Alternatively, one may think of specific 
assets which are of a higher value to the borrower than to the lender. We further 
assume  LGD w<  so that the loan cannot be fully secured even if the total wealth 
is made use of. 
The figure below describes the sequential moves in the renegotiation game. 
  ((Insert figure about here.)) 
In stage one, the project succeeds with probability  ) 1 ( PD −  and fails otherwise. 
This is observed by the borrower while the lender remains uninformed. 
In  stage  two,  a  successful  borrower  has  the  choice  between  meeting  his 
obligations  and  paying  ) 1 ( i +   where  ) ( r i <   is  the  contractual  interest  rate  or 
cheating, i.e. pretending the project has failed and just paying  ) 1 ( LGD − . It is 
common knowledge that the project’s outcome cannot be lower than  ) 1 ( LGD − . 
Therefore, the borrower can be forced to pay out the respective amount so that he 
will  never  pay  less  than  ) 1 ( LGD − .  He  chooses  to  pay  the  low  amount  of 
) 1 ( LGD −  with probability  h. A borrower whose project has failed cannot pay 
more than  ) 1 ( LGD −  and defaults anyway. Whenever the borrower does not pay 
back the loan completely, the amount of collateral specified by the contract is 
transferred to the lender. 
In  stage  three,  having  received  a  payment  of  ) 1 ( LGD − ,  the  lender  has  to 
choose between initiating a bankruptcy procedure and taking over the project or to 
renegotiate the loan. We denote the probability of a bankruptcy procedure by  b . 
In the bankruptcy case, the lender takes over the firm which causes bankruptcy 
costs of  ) 1 ( α − ,  ) 1 ; 0 ( ∈ α , times the assets of the firm, thus increasing the lender’s 
wealth  by  ) 1 ( LGD α −   or  ) 1 ( r α + ,  respectively.  In  case  of  renegotiation,  the 
lender  reduces  the  borrower’s  obligation  to  ) 1 ( LGD −   so  that  the  contract  is 
settled by the borrower’s prior payment. Any reduction to an amount exceeding 
) 1 ( LGD −   turns  out  to  be  useless  because  the  borrower  could  still  claim  a 
liquidity default has happened. Again, the lender would have to induce bankruptcy 
in order to verify whether the borrower has been cheating or not. 
If the bankruptcy procedure reveals the borrower has been cheating, the lender 
may,  depending  on  parameter  values,  receive  a  net  payment  exceeding  the 
borrower’s  obligation.  In  fact,  there  may  be  a  legal  environment  limiting  the 
lender’s net receivable to the borrower’s obligation, thus forbidding contractual 
sanctions exceeding the effective damage. As a robustness check we analyzed this 
setting as well. The results depend on the parameter values. In case of sufficiently 
high bankruptcy costs  ) 1 ( α − , the modified model completely corresponds to the 
basic  model  presented  below.  If  instead  bankruptcy  costs  are  low,  the  use  of 6 
collateral turns out to be generally suboptimal because it is cheaper to transfer the 
firm’s  assets  to  the  borrower  rather  than  to  incur  the  costs  associated  with 
collateral. In what follows, we continue to assume that the lender completely takes 
over the in case of bankruptcy. 
Then, the expected profit of the lender is 
(2)
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The borrower yields the expected profit 
(3)  PDc c LGD r b h hbc i r h PD h πB − − + − + − − − − = )] )( 1 ( ) )( 1 )[( 1 ( )} ( E{ . 
In order to solve the renegotiation game, we have to determine the equilibrium 
mixed strategies. Due to equation (2), the lender is indifferent between choosing a 
bankruptcy procedure or not,  0 / } E{ = ∂ ∂ b πL , if the borrower chooses to cheat 
with probability 
(4) 
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Substituting  r  from equation (1) shows that  ) 1 ( ) 1 (   α LGD + < −  is a necessary 
and  sufficient  condition  for  mixed  strategies  ) 1 * ( < h .  Otherwise,  it  is  strictly 
dominant for the lender to never induce bankruptcy  ) 0 * ( = b , implying that the 
borrower  always  prefers  to  cheat  ) 1 * ( = h .  Intuitively,  bankruptcy  cannot  be 
optimal for the lender if the loss given default or the bankruptcy costs are too high 
because there is either too little to be gained or only at a too high cost. Given the 
restrictions on collateral, the lender cannot earn non-negative profits in this case 
so that he will never sign a contract. Therefore, a pure strategy on part of the 
borrower must be off the equilibrium path in the contracting game. 
If the borrower does not pay back the loan, the lender has to decide between 
inducing  a  bankruptcy  procedure  or  not.  Due  to  equation  (3),  the  borrower  is 
indifferent  between  cheating  and  paying  back,  0 / } E{ = ∂ ∂ h πB ,  if  the  lender 







= * . 
Given  our  assumptions,  it  is  obvious  that  the  lender  will  never  choose  pure 
strategies so that  1 * 0 < < b . 
Potential lenders compete by offering contracts of the form  ) ), 1 (( Γ c i + = . If 
the  borrower  finds  none  of  the  contracts  acceptable,  the  game  is  over  and  all 
players realize zero profits. Otherwise the borrower undertakes the investment by 
accepting the offer of one of the lenders. The equilibrium contract maximizes the 
borrower’s expected profit (equation (3), having inserted (4) and (5) for the mixed 
strategy variables) subject to the lender’s participation constraint (equation (2), 
accounting for the reservation profit level). We allow for imperfect competition 
between lenders who require a reservation profit of  0 ≥ π , indicating the lender’s 7 
market or bargaining power. Most models stipulate perfect competition between 
lenders, i.e.  0 = π . Given π , the lender’s participation constraint implies 
(6) 
*) 1 )( 1 (
) *))( 1 ( * (
h PD
π c β LGD h PD h
i
− −
+ − − +
= . 
In the mixed strategy equilibrium, the borrower is indifferent between all cheating 
strategies.  Hence,  we  may  set  0 = h   in  equation  (3),  substitute  for  i  using 
equation (6), and substitute for  r  using equation (1) to obtain for the borrower’s 
expected profit in equation (3) 
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where κ is the critical upper cost level up to which the use of collateral increases 
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implying  that  κ  is  the  key  variable  indicating  the  role  of  collateral  in  debt 
contracting. As it becomes obvious from (7),  0 / > ∂ ∂ PD κ , i.e., the riskier the 
project, measured by the probability of default, the more probable is the use of 
collateral. Up to here, our results confirm the main findings of BESTER [1994] (in 
particular proposition 4) and add the additional insight that the relation between 
project risk and the use of collateral is not influenced by the degree of competition 
between lenders. 
Equation (7) further implies  0 / < ∂ ∂ LGD κ  so that the comparative statics are 
reversed if risk is measured by LGD instead of PD. As both variables contribute to 
the lender’s expected loss, this observation raises first doubts on the robustness of 
Bester’s results. 
3.  Restatement of the model using mean-preserving risk measures 
Raising  the  probability  of  default  PD  while  holding  constant  any  other 
explanatory factor does not only imply a certain reasoning of “increasing risk” but 
at the same time a decline in the expected return. Therefore, it is not clear whether 
the implications are due to an increasing risk or to a decreasing expected return. 
In order to get clear cut results with respect to the relation between project risk 
and  the  use  of  collateral  we  argue  that  the  propositions  of  ROTHSCHILD  AND 8 
STIGLITZ [1970] on increasing risk should be taken into account. Rothschild and 
Stiglitz propose three different definitions of increasing risk which (in case of 
continuously  distributed  random  variables)  turn  out  to  be  equivalent  holding 
constant the expected value: the addition of noise, the mean-preserving spread, 
and second-order stochastic dominance  ) 2 (SD . Within the two-point distribution 
in our model, the last version is the most useful one to analyze increasing risk. In 
fact, using the  2 SD  criterion is the only alternative which allows for staying in 
the two-point setting. 
According to equation (1), there are in principle two sources of increasing risk, 
either an increasing probability of default  PD or an increasing loss given default 
LGD while adjusting the respective other parameter and  r  in order to ensure a 
constant expected rate of return    . These possibilities are analyzed successively. 
3.1  Increasing risk by an increased probability of default 
We  start  with the  analysis  of  an  increase  in  the  probability  of  default  PD  to 
compare the results to the BESTER [1994] model. If increasing risk is introduced 
by an increase in  PD, the invariance of     can be insured either by an increase in 
r  or by a decrease in  LGD or by a combination of these two variations. As can 
easily  be  seen,  any  variation  of  a  two-point  distribution  going  along  with  a 
decrease  in  LGD  cannot  be  compatible  with  the  original  distribution  being 
stochastically dominant because the support of the distribution is shifted to the 
right.  Therefore,  the  new  distribution  holds  the  property  of  being  more  risky 
according to  2 SD  than the original distribution if and only if the increase in  PD 
is  compensated  solely  by  an  increase  in  r ,  the  rate  of  return  in  case  of  the 
project’s success. Substituting r  from (1) in condition (7) leads to 
(8) 
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Obviously, if the increase in  PD is compensated for, there is no further influence 
on the critical cost level  κ. This unambiguously implies that an increase in  PD 
has no impact on κ: 
PROPOSITION 1: Holding constant the project’s expected return, increasing risk 
induced by a higher probability of default does not have any impact on the use of 
collateral. 
Proposition 1 stands in clear contrast to the result of BESTER [1994] who argues 
that collateral is more effective if high risk projects are financed. We show that 
Bester’s argumentation is only true if the project’s expected return is not constant 
thereby violating the  2 SD  criterion of the Rothschild and Stiglitz definition of 
increasing risk. 
3.2  Increasing risk by an increased loss given default 
The second way to impose an increased default risk on the lender is to increase the 
loss given default  LGD. If increasing risk is introduced by an increase in  LGD, 9 
the  logic  as  above  applies:  the  invariance  of      can  be  insured  either  by  an 
increase in r  or by a decrease in PD  or by a combination of these two variations. 
Here,  all  alternatives  may  be  compatible  with  the  new  distribution  being 
dominated according to the  2 SD  criterion. 
Again, substituting either  r  or  PD from equation (1) into equation (7) yields 
equation (8). Therefore, no matter which way of compensation for the increased 
LGD is used, holding constant the project’s expected rate of return, the critical 
cost  level  κ  does  not  depend  on  PD  but  only  on  LGD  with  the  property 
0 / < ∂ ∂ LGD κ . Therefore, we state 
PROPOSITION 2: Holding constant the project’s expected return, increasing risk 
measured by the loss given default leads to a decrease in the use of collateral. 
Proposition 2 not only clarifies the conditions under which the results of BESTER 
[1994] hold but also gives an explanation for the ambiguous empirical evidence 
presented above. 
4.  Conclusion 
In  his  predecessor  model  of  debt  renegotiation,  BESTER  [1994]  argues  that 
collateral is more effective if high risk projects are financed. This result, however, 
crucially  depends  on  the  definition  of  risk.  Using  the  second-order  stochastic 
dominance criterion, we have shown that it is not a project’s high risk, induced by 
a  high  probability  of  default,  that  makes  collateral  more  effective.  Under 
conditions implying a constant expected return, the probability of default has no 
impact  on  the  effectiveness  of  collateral.  Moreover,  an  increasing  risk  of  the 
project caused by an increasing loss given default makes the use of collateral even 
less  effective.  These  results  stand  in  sharp  contrast  to  the  main  conclusion  in 
Bester’s  model.  Varying  only  a  project’s  probability  of  default,  it  is  not  the 
project’s risk that determines the influence of collateral but its expected return. As 
our  analysis  has  shown,  if  the  project’s  expected  return  is  assumed  to  be 
exogenously given, increasing risk either does not have any impact on collateral at 
all or makes the use of collateral even less probable. Therefore, our model seems 
to be appropriate to bridge the gap to the alternative models of debt contracts as 
cited in the introduction as well as to the empirical evidence in this important area 
of research. 
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